

Political Trust in Africa and the Arab Region

Handbook of Political Trust

Supplementary Appendix

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INTRODUCTION

This appendix presents descriptions for the individual-level and macro-level variables used in the analyses found in the chapter.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES

Table A1: Individual-level Variable Descriptions and Measurement for the Afrobarometer

Variable	Description	Range and Mean	Data and Coding Sources
Government Performance	Index of individual evaluation of government performance across different areas: job creation, price stability, and income inequality.	Range: 0-poor; 3-excellent Mean: 0.98	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: see Hutchison and Johnson (2011); Hutchison (2011b)
Democratic Satisfaction	Response to question: How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?	Range: -1-not a democracy; 0-very dissatisfied; 3-very satisfied Mean: 1.58	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: n/a
Government Satisfaction	Index of individual overall approval of government institutions: president, legislature, and local government.	Range: 0-strongly disapprove; 3-strongly approve Mean: 1.68	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: see Hutchison and Johnson (2011); Hutchison (2011b)
Economic Satisfaction	Response to question: Presently, are you dissatisfied, neither, or satisfied with the national economy?	Range: 0-very dissatisfied; 6-very satisfied Mean: 1.58	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: see Hutchison and Johnson (2011); Hutchison (2011b)
Political Participation	Index of individual level of political participation across different activities: attend meeting, attend demonstration, raise an issue and contact government official.	Range: 0-no participation; 3-high participation Mean: 0.69	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: see Hutchison and Johnson (2011); Hutchison (2011b)
Political Interest	Index of individual level of political interest based self-reported interest in politics and frequency in discussing politics.	Range: 0-no interest; 2-high interest Mean: 0.95	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: see Hutchison and Johnson (2011); Hutchison (2011b)
Economic Hardship	Index of individual level of economic hardship based on the frequency the respondent went without food, water, and medicine in the previous year.	Range: 0-no hardship; 3-extreme economic hardship Mean: 0.76	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: see Hutchison and Johnson (2011); Hutchison (2011b)
Media Exposure	Index of individual level of media exposure based on the frequency the respondent received news from the following sources: radio, television, and newspapers.	Range: 0-no exposure; 4-high exposure Mean: 2.01	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: see Hutchison and Johnson (2011); Hutchison (2011b)
Age	Self-reported age of the respondent at the time of the survey.	Range: 15 to 130 Mean: 36.4	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: see Hutchison and Johnson (2011); Hutchison (2011b)
Gender	Gender of the respondent.	Range: 0-male; 1-female Mean: 0.499	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: see Hutchison and Johnson (2011); Hutchison (2011b)
Education	Self-reported highest level of education completed by the respondent.	Range: 0-no formal schooling; 1-primary; 2-secondary; 3-post-secondary Mean: 1.47	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: see Hutchison and Johnson (2011); Hutchison (2011b)
Urban	Interviewer indicator of whether respondent lived in a rural or urban location.	Range: 0-rural; 1-urban Mean: 0.39	Data: Afrobarometer, Rds 1-4 Coding: see Hutchison and Johnson (2011); Hutchison (2011b)

Table A2: Individual-level Variable Descriptions and Measurement for the Arab Barometer

Variable	Description	Range and Mean	Data and Coding Sources
Government Performance	Index of individual evaluation of government performance across different areas: handling the economy, job creation, income inequality, and improving health services.	Range: 0-poor; 3-excellent Mean: 1.13	Data: Arabarometer, Rds 1-2 Coding: n/a
Government Satisfaction	Overall satisfaction with government performance.	Range: 0-absolutely unsatisfied; 9-very satisfied Mean: 3.72	Data: Arabarometer, Rds 1-2 Coding: n/a
Government Responsiveness	Index of individual assessment of government responsiveness in the following areas: leaders care about ordinary citizens & officials seriously consider citizens' opinions.	Range: 0-not responsive; 3-very responsive Mean: 1.13	Data: Arabarometer, Rds 1-2 Coding: n/a
Economic Satisfaction	Response to question: How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country?	Range: 0-very bad; 3-very good Mean: 1.09	Data: Arabarometer, Rds 1-2 Coding: n/a
Unconditional Government Support	Response to statement: People should support government even if they disagree with the decision.	Range: 0-strongly disagree; 3-strongly agree Mean: 1.29	Data: Arabarometer, Rds 1-2 Coding: n/a
Political Interest	Response to question: How interested would you say you are in politics?	Range: 0-not at all interested; 3-very interested Mean: 1.26	Data: Arabarometer, Rds 1-2 Coding: n/a
Social Trust	Response to question: Generally speaking, do you think most people are trustworthy or not?	Range: 0-must be careful with others; 1-most people can be trusted Mean: 0.27	Data: Arabarometer, Rds 1-2 Coding: n/a
Age	Age category of the respondent at the time of the survey.	Range: 0 (18-24); 6 (75 and older) Mean: 1.76	Data: Arabarometer, Rds 1-2 Coding: n/a
Gender	Gender of the respondent.	Range: 0-male; 1-female Mean: 0.504	Data: Arabarometer, Rds 1-2 Coding: n/a
Education	Self-reported highest level of education completed by the respondent.	Range: 0-no completed elementary/illiterate; 6-advanced university degree Mean: 2.81	Data: Arabarometer, Rds 1-2 Coding: n/a
Employed	Response to question: Do you work?	Range: 0-not employed; 1-employed Mean: 0.48	Data: Arabarometer, Rds 1-2 Coding: n/a

MACRO-LEVEL VARIABLES

Here we detail the macro-level variables used in the analyses of the chapter discussing their source, measurement, and range with our respective samples.

Militarized Interstate Disputes. To measure both the level and the nature of external threat to the state experienced by individuals prior to a survey, we rely on indicators from the Correlates of War militarized interstate dispute (MID) dataset (Palmer et al. 2015). This dataset identifies events involving the threat, show, or use of force between two or more states from 1816 to 2010. In the extensive research on international conflict, MID's typically signify legitimate external threats to the state (see Vasquez 2009). Here we adopt the coding specifications outlined in Hutchison and Gibler (2007) and replicated in other similar projects examining the impact of external threat on individual political behavior (see Hutchison 2011a, 2011b; Gibler et al. 2012; Miller 2013). Under these specifications, we calculate the number of militarized disputes in the five year period prior to the survey as well as distinguish between territorial and non-territorial disputes.¹ For the Afrobarometer sample, the number of territorial disputes and non-territorial disputes range from 0 to 4 and 0 to 7, respectively. In the Arab Barometer sample, the number of territorial disputes and non-territorial disputes range from 0 to 1 and 0 to 6, respectively.

Relative Political Extraction. To evaluate institutional efficiency we utilize Kugler and Tammen's (2012) indicator of political performance: relative political extraction (RPE). This indicator is the ratio of actual to expected tax revenue extracted by a country in a given year based resource abundance and economic endowment. Tax effort comprises a key facet of political performance (Lotz and Morse 1967; Tilly 1975) and represents the willingness of individuals to transfer earnings to the government accounting for structural and sectoral composition and reflects a key aspect of state capacity (Englebert 2000; Arbetman and Kugler 1997; Kugler and Tammen 2012). Relative political extraction (RPE) has a robust track record as an indicator of institutional efficiency and political performance, and avoids the normative traps associated with indicators that rely on attributes of regime type (Organski and Kugler 1980; Arbetman and Kugler 1997; Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2005; Kugler and Tammen 2012). We opt for the agricultural based estimate as it is more theoretically appropriate for developing countries. RPE ranges from 0.01 to 3.8, with values below 1 reflecting lower than expected tax extraction given economic endowment, and values above one reflecting higher than expected performance. In our sub-Saharan Africa sample, Zimbabwe in 2009 had the lowest RPE at .19, and Lesotho had the highest with values over 2 in 2000, 2008, and 2009. In our Arab region sample, Yemen had the lowest RPE at .26 in 2007, and Algeria had the highest RPE at 1.45 in 2011. For further details on estimation of RPE, please see Kugler and Tammen (2012) or Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2005).

Ethnic Fractionalization. We use Fearon and Laitin's (2003) ethnic fractionalization measure of ethnic diversity for each country in across our samples.² As discussed in Hutchison and Johnson (2011), countries are not ethnically neutral and high diversity levels may affect whether those countries adopt exclusionary policies that result in lower levels of individual political trust. This variable ranges from 0.25 to 0.95 in the Afrobarometer sample and 0.04 to 0.78 in the Arab Barometer sample.

¹ Previous studies consistently demonstrate that territorial disputes exert a strong negative influence on individual political attitudes related to democratic values and governance, including political trust, while the effect of non-territorial disputes on these attitudes and behaviors is inconsistent (Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Hutchison 2011a, 2011b; Gibler et al. 2012; Miller 2013). Furthermore, these relationships are consistent across regions, including sub-Saharan Africa.

² We use this measure instead of Posner's (2004) politically relevant ethnic group (PREG) indicator that we employed in previous studies (see Hutchison and Johnson 2011) because Posner's data only extended throughout sub-Saharan Africa and not for the Arab region countries in our WVS sample.

Continuous Democracy. To account for a country's exposure to the practice of democratic norms over time, we include an indicator of continuous democracy measured in total number of years. The democratic learning hypothesis asserts that an individual's overall exposure to democracy positively affects democratic values and evaluative assessments of government (see Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Hutchison and Gibler 2007). We use the Polity IV democracy-autocracy score to generate this variable (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). We simply sum the total number of years that a country has scored above a 6 on this scale consecutively prior to the survey year. This variable ranges from 0 to 43 in the Afrobarometer sample.

Democracy-Autocracy. Given that only one country in the Arab Barometer sample, Lebanon, was considered a democracy at the time of the survey, we use a different indicator to measure a country's relative exposure to the practice of democratic norms. For the Arab region, we use the Polity IV democracy-autocracy score to measure the overall level of democracy or autocracy in the country (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). We simply use the score in the year prior to the survey. This variable ranges from -10 (complete autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). In our Arab region sample, this variable ranges from -10 (Saudi Arabia) to 7 (Lebanon).

Economic Development. To control for the level of economic development in any given survey year, we rely on the UN's Human Development Index indicator. The annual Human Development Index (HDI) is an index based on three indicators of development recorded for each country every five years: life expectancy, education, and GDP per capita. In our sample, we use the score recorded for the year closest to the administration of the survey. This index ranges from 0, indicating no development, to 1 indicating the highest level of development (United Nations Development Programme 2014). This variable ranges from 0.247 to 0.626 in the Afrobarometer sample and from 0.408 to 0.777 in the Arab Barometer sample.

Civil Conflict. To assess the effect on internal conflict on political trust, we use internal armed conflict as our indicator of violent civil unrest. For this civil conflict indicator, we draw from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, which has data on both large-scale civil wars and small-scale incidents of violence (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Here we adopt a binary measure of whether the country experienced at least one conflict between an internal group and the state that resulted in at least 25 battle deaths during the year prior to the survey.

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